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NOTES
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT-SAY GOODBYE TO DONNA
REED: RECOGNIZING STEPMOTHERS' RIGHTS

INTRODUCTION

Donna Reed has been described as the "quintessential Ameri
can housewife."! Similarly, her family could be described as the
quintessential American family-"a husband who was employed, a
wife who was a homemaker, and two or three children."2 However,
the definition of the "American family" is constantly in transition. 3
For example, consider the evolution of American families in popu
lar television since the "Donna Reed era,"4 such as the blended
family in The Brady Bunch,5 and the same-sex couple who adopted
and raised a son in Will & Grace. 6 Statistics also prove that the
composition of the American family is ever changing. In 1970, forty
1. Gilmore Girls: That Damn Donna Reed (WB television broadcast Feb. 22,
2001); see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Pornography and Harm to Women:
"No Empirical Evidence?," 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1042 n.27 (1992) (stating that "televi
sion presented images of the idyllic housewife in The Donna Reed Show" (citing The
Donna Reed Show (ABC television broadcast 1958-1966»).
2. Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children: Justifying Same·Sex Marriage
from the Perspective ofa Child of the Union, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 411, 417 n.44 (1999).
Furthermore, "[t]he 1950s saw the advent of such television staples as The Ozzie and
Harriet Show, Leave it to Beaver, and The Donna Reed Show, all of which featured
suburban mothers who cared for their homes and imparted meaningful moral instruc
tion to their children." Melissa E. Murray, Whatever Happened to G.I. Jane?: Citizen
ship, Gender, and Social Policy in the Postwar Era, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 91, 123
(2002).
3. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) ("The demographic changes of
the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family.").
4. Amy D. Ronner, Women Who Dance on the Professional Track: Custody and
the Red Shoes, 23 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 173, 184 (2000) ("[O]ne scholar has coined the
'so-called "Donna Reed" era,' with a 'working father and a mother who remained at
home with the children' ...." (quoting Debra L. Swank, Day Care and Parental Em
ployment: What Weight Should They Be Given in Child Custody Disputes?, 41 VILL. L.
REV. 909, 919·20 (1996»).
5. The Brady Bunch (ABC television broadcast 1969-1974). This series focused
on a blended family in which Mike Brady, who had his three sons from a previous
marriage, married Carol, who had three daughters from her previous marriage. ld.
6. Will & Grace: The Finale (NBC television broadcast May 18, 2006).
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percent of American households consisted of a heterosexual mar
ried couple with minor children.? By 2003, that percentage had
dropped to twenty-three. 8 In order to reflect the continuous change
in the definition of family, legislatures and courts must say goodbye
to the Donna Reed mold and legalize relationships that society al
ready views as part of the family unit. 9
While many states have taken a liberal approach to recognizing
new familial relationships, some courts and legislatures have been
unwilling to expand their definition of family beyond the traditional
nuclear family.lO In Amy G. v. M. W., the California Court of Ap
peal held that a stepmother, who had raised her stepson since in
fancy, could not be joined as a necessary party in a maternity suit
because she lacked standing as an interested person. l1 The court
reasoned that because Amy G. had no biological connection to the
child, and the biological mother had also petitioned for maternity,
Amy G. did not have standing because she could not be the child's
mother.1 2 In so deciding, the court applied California's enactment
of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).13 This Note examines that
7. JASON FIELDS, V.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING AR
RANGEMENTS: 2003, at 4 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20
553.pdf.
8. Id.
9. See generally Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
(holding that granting marriage licenses to only heterosexual couples violated the Mas
sachusetts constitution).
10. Various courts have enacted legislation that limits the definition of marriage
as between one man and one woman, and considers marriages entered into by same-sex
couples in other jurisdictions to be void. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (LexisNexis
2006); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (Lexis
Nexis 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West 2005); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1704 (West 2001). Some states directly or indirectly preclude same-sex couples from
adopting children. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, V.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., WHO MAY ADOPT, BE ADOPTED, OR PLACE A CHILD FOR ADOPTION?
SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 3 (2006), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/system
widellaws_policies/statutes/partiesall.pdf (Florida and Mississippi have enacted specific
legislation that disallows same-sex couples to adopt; V tah has enacted legislation that
only allows married couples to adopt children and does not allow same-sex couples to
marry); see also B.F. v. T.D., 194 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. 2006) (holding that a woman whose
partner had adopted a child during their eight-year relationship did not have standing
to allege status as a de fasto custodian despite her financial and emotional care for the
child).
11. Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review de
nied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
2252 (2007).
12. Id.
13. VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B V.L.A. 377 (2001); see CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 7600-7730 (West 2004).
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law and proposes that the UPA be read in a gender-neutral fashion
to allow a stepmother to have standing as an interested party in an
action to establish maternity.
Part I of this Note details the history of the UPA, the guiding
principles used by courts in deciding paternity issues, and how
courts have interpreted the UPA to find legal parentage in persons
who are not the child's genetic parents. Part II examines the factual
and legal background of Amy G. and discusses the various argu
ments as to whether Amy G. should have had standing to assert her
claim. Part III concludes that a gender-neutral application of the
UPA, which would give stepmothers standing in maternity suits, is
the correct interpretation for several reasons: First, a child can
have three potential parents for the purpose of standing, and the
court can thereafter determine who the child's two legal parents are
at a trial on the merits.14 Second, since biology is not the deciding
factor in all parentage determinations, genetics should not trump all
other factors in maternity suits. IS Third, a stepmother should have
standing in a maternity suit because a child can have two mothers. 16
Fourth, a stepmother, like a stepfather, should benefit from the pre
sumption of legitimacy, which is also known as the marital pre
sumption.17 Finally, upon granting a stepmother standing to assert
maternity, her claim to maternity can be weighed against the bio
logical mother's claim through a gender-neutral reading of the
UPA.18

14. See infra Part III.A; see also L.A. County Dep't or Children & Family Servs.
v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004) (granting two men standing in a
paternity action and determining who the child's legal father was at trial); L.A County
Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Mario A. (In re Kiana A), 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669,
675-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (same); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc)
(same).
15. See infra Part III.B; see also Alameda County Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly
H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002) (granting a nonbiological parent stand
ing in a parentage suit); Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salva
dor M.), 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (same); L.A County Dep't of
Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (same).
16. See infra Part IILC; see also Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County,
117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a child can have two legal mothers).
17. See infra Part IILD; see also Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 913 (R.I.
1990) (discussing the presumption of legitimacy).
18. See infra Part 1I1.E. See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal.
1993) (applying the UPA, in a gender-neutral fashion, to a situation that was not con
templated when the UPA was drafted).
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ACT

Over time, courts and legislatures have shifted their standing
analysis in parentage suits from the principle that biology or mar
riage trumps all other factors, toward recognition of the rights of
persons not traditionally seen as parents. 19 This Part discusses the
process that some courts have used in recognizing different familial
relationships. Subpart A addresses the drafting of the UPA, from
its original purpose of protecting nonmarital children to recent revi
sions made necessary by advances in science. 2o Subpart B discusses
some principles that courts consistently use in determining parent
age such as the marital presumption, the importance of a biological
relationship with the child, the two-legal-parents paradigm, and the
"best interests of the child" standard. 21 Finally, subpart C details
the way in which the UPA has been interpreted to allow persons
other than biological mothers and fathers to have standing and, in
some cases, to be declared legal parents. 22
A.

Enactment and Pertinent Provisions
1.

Introduction

In 1972, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni
form State Laws (NCCUSL) drafted the UPA with the purpose of
"eliminat[ing] the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
19. See generally Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A2d 726, 728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)
(stating that the purpose of the marital presumption was to prevent the stigma of illegit
imacy); Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), 122 P.3d 161, 167 (Wash. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2021 (2006) ("Washington courts have long recognized that individu
als not biologically nor legally related to the children whom they 'parent' may neverthe
less be considered a child's 'psychological parent.' ").
20. See David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between
Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMPo L. 125, 129
(2006); Jenny Wald, Legitimate Parents: Construing California's Uniform Parentage Act
to Protect Children Born into Nontraditional Families, 6 J. CTR. FOR FAM. CHILD. &
CTS. 139, 140 (2005).
21. See generally Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669 (two-parent paradigm); N.AH. V.
S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (best interests of the child standard); John M. V. Paula T.,
571 A2d 1380 (Pa. 1990) (marital presumption); John Lawrence Hill, What Does It
Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1991) (importance of biology).
22. See, e.g., Elisa B., 117 P.3d 660; L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family
Servs. V. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); Johnson, 851 P.2d 776;
Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salvador M.), 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d
705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. V. Leticia C.
(In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); N.AH. V. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354
(Colo. 2000) (en banc).
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children."23 At early common law, a nonmarital child "was filius
nullius, a child without rights. "24 The phrase "filius nullius" sum
marizes the English and American rule that a nonmarital child had
no specific right to support from either biological parent. 25 In the
late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down
several decisions declaring that the legislatively mandated unequal
treatment of children based upon the marital status of their biologi
cal parents was unconstitutional.26 As a result, the UPA was
drafted to provide a solution for legislatures in states whose previ
ous laws had discriminated between marital and nonmarital
children. 27
Changes in technology, primarily those advances in the area of
genetic testing, necessitated that a new version of the UPA be
drafted in 2000. 28 The UPA was further modified in 2002 to include
provisions that grappled with new scientific advances and defined
parties to paternity and maternity suits.29 Currently, some version
23. Wald, supra note 20, at 140; see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B U.L.A.
378-80 (2001) (prefatory note). "The parent and child relationship extends equally to
every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." Id. § 2.
24. R.H. Helmholz, Support Orders, Church Courts, and the Rule of Filius Nul
lius: A Reassessment of the Common Law, 63 VA. L. REV. 431, 432 (1977).
25. Id. at 431. In 1576, the English Parliament passed the Poor Law due to the
financial burden on the English Church and State, which was created by the complete
lack of support from nonmarital parents. It provided that the government would im
pose a criminal penalty on biological parents who failed to provide sustenance for their
nonmarital children. H. Paul Breslin, Liability of Possible Fathers: A Support Remedy
for Illegitimate Children, 18 STAN. L. REV. 859, 859 n.5 (1966) (citing Poor Law Act of
1956, 18 Eliz. 1, c. 3 (Eng.». The vast majority of American states have followed suit
and enacted similar laws. Id. at 860.
26. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that
a Texas court's denial of child support for nonmarital minor children was unconstitu
tional because a state could not "invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children");
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165-67 (1972) (determining that the
denial of the rights of dependent nonmarital children to recover under Louisiana's
workmen's compensation laws violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, considering that their siblings who were marital children were able to
recover); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69-72 (1968) (holding that the Louisiana Court
of Appeal's interpretation of a "child" who has standing to bring a wrongful death
action to mean only a "legitimate" child violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminated against a class of persons whose legiti
macy had no relation to the tort that was the subject of the action); John G. New, Note,
"Aren't You Lucky You Have Two Mamas?": Redefining Parenthood in Light of Evolv
ing Reproductive Technologies and Social Change, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773, 777
(2006).
27. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B U.L.A. 378 (prefatory note).
28. Meyer, supra note 20, at 129.
29. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law:
Children's Issues Remain the Focus, 37 FAM. L.Q. 527, 532 (2004).
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of the UPA has been adopted in twenty-one states. 3D In these
states, the UPA plays an integral part in assisting legislators in up
dating and interpreting their parentage statutes in accordance with
the evolving definition of family. Its continuing role is marked by a
purpose of preventing discrimination based on legitimacy and revi
sions addressing scientific advances.

2.

Relevant Paternity Provisions of the UPA

In conjunction with its broad purpose to ensure equal treat
ment of marital and nonmarital children, the UPA includes provi
sions to determine paternity that encompass the broadest number
of potential fathers. 31 These provisions reflect a general concern
for the "financial and emotional consequences of a child having
only one legally recognized parent."32 Specifically, there are three
dominant reasons why an increase in the number of potential fa
thers furthers the UPA's general goals: First, it prevents the socie
tal problem of having children who have only one legal parent, are
financially dependent on the state, and lack the emotional and fi
nancial security of the historically recognized two-parent support
system. 33 Second, it preserves a child's relationship with the person
that the child recognizes as a parent.34 Third, it protects the rights
that a child acquires through parents, including the rights to receive
30. The 1973 UPA was adopted in whole or in part by Alabama, California, Colo
rado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Ohio, and Rhode Island. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B U.L.A. 65
(Supp. 2007). Delaware, North Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming also adopted the
1973 UPA and later repealed the Act in order to adopt the 2000 version. Id. Further
more, the 2000 version (including the 2002 amendment) has been amended or adopted
by Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 2007).
31. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 16

17.
32. Maggie Manternach, Note, Where Is My Other Mommy?: Applying the Pre
sumed Father Provision of the Uniform Parentage Act to Recognize the Rights of Lesbian
Mothers and Their Children, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 385, 388 (2005).
33. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570(a) (West 2004). When the California legislature
adopted the UPA, it added a provision regarding the purpose of establishing paternity:
There is a compelling state interest in establishing paternity for all chil
dren. Establishing paternity is the first step toward a child support award,
which, in turn, provides children with equal rights and access to benefits, in
cluding, but not limited to, social security, health insurance, survivors' bene
fits, military benefits, and inheritance rights. Knowledge of family medical
history is often necessary for correct medical diagnosis and treatment. Addi
tionally, knowing one's father is important to a child's development.
[d.

34.

See Wald, supra note 20, at 145.
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child support and health insurance benefits while the parent is
alive,35 and to inherit by intestacy, receive life insurance benefits,
social security benefits, and standing in a wrongful-death suit in the
event of a parent's death. 36 In light of these reasons, the UPA's
presumed-father provision includes the broadest possible number
of potential fathers to protect a child's two-parent support system
and the rights acquired with that system. 37
The UPA provides a number of specific ways that a parent and
child relationship can be established. 38 However, only interested
parties can bring an action to establish a parent-child relationship.39
In such an action, the child, the natural mother, and any men al
leged to be the natural or presumed father, have standing and may
be joined as necessary parties. 40
The UPA specifies a procedure for determining paternity when
there are several alleged fathers.41 It states that a man may be pre
sumed to be the father if he: (1) was married to the mother during
the birth of the child, (2) attempted to marry the mother before the
birth of the child, (3) married or attempted to marry the mother
35. In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1038 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2005).
36. See generally Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that children's
rights to sue for the wrongful death of their parents could not be denied because their
mother was not married at the time of their births).
37. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 204 (amended 2002), 9B u.L.A. 16-17
(Supp. 2007).
38. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr (1973) § 3, 9B U.L.A. 391-92 (2001) ("(1)
the natural mother may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child, or
under this Act; (2) the natural father may be established under this Act; (3) an adoptive
parent may be established by proof of adoption ...."), with UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr
§ 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15 (stating that the mother and child relationship
may be established by giving birth to the child, adjudication of a woman's maternity,
adoption, or adjudication of maternity under a gestational agreement, and the father
and child relationship may be established by an unrebutted presumption of paternity,
acknowledgment of paternity, adjudication of paternity, adoption, consent to assisted
reproduction, or adjudication of paternity under a gestational agreement.).
39. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a) (West 2004); UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr (1973)
§§ 6(b), 21, 9B U.L.A. 411, 494 ("Interested persons" are limited to those who have a
particular interest in the action, which include mothers, fathers, and potential fathers.).
In the new Uniform Act, "the child, the mother of the child, a man whose paternity is to
be adjudicated, a support-enforcement agency, an authorized adoption agency or li
censed child-placing agency, a representative of a deceased, incapacitated or minor per
son, or an intended parent under a gestational contract have standing." Nat'l
Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Summary: Uniform Parentage Act (2002),
http://www.nccusl.orglUpdate/uniformacCsummaries/uniformacts-s-upa.asp.
40. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr (1973) § 9, 9B U.L.A. 435.
41. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 16-17; UNIF.
PARENTAGE Acr (1973) § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 393-94.
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after the birth of the child, (4) "receive[d] the child into his home
and openly [held] out the child as his natural child," or (5) acknowl
edged paternity in writing. 42 If conflicting presumptions arise, each
man will have standing43 and, at trial, the court will weigh the com
peting claims according to "policy and logic."44 Based on these pro
visions, determinations of paternity follow a three-step procedure:
First, a presumed father receives standing in a paternity action. 45
Second, the court determines if it is an "appropriate action" for the
presumption to be rebutted. If this is the case, the court will move
to the third and final step of weighing the evidence according to
"policy and logic" to determine which presumed father should be
the child's legal father. 46
Interestingly, the UPA specifies that those provisions relating
to paternity also relate to maternity, "[i]nsofar as practicable."47
However, the UPA provides separately for the establishment of a
mother and child relationship.48 Under UPA section 201, a mother
and child relationship can be established in only four ways: (1)
proof of giving birth to the child; (2) adjudication of maternity; (3)
adoption; and (4) adjudication to confirm a surrogacy agreement. 49
The narrow scope of section 201 stands in stark contrast to those
provisions granting standing to the broadest number of potential
fathers in a paternity action in order to avoid a determination of
42. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. 393-94. The 2002 version of
the UPA does not include a presumption for men who have signed an acknowledgment
of paternity, and it replaced "received the child into his home" with "for the first two
years of the child's life, he resided in the same household with the child." UNIF. PAR·
ENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 17. Other jurisdictions that have not
adopted the UPA have adopted similar statutes. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C,
§ 6(a) (2007) (creating a presumption of paternity in a man if he was married to the
mother, he and the mother "received the child into their home and openly held out the
child as their child," or he signed an acknowledgment of paternity).
43. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 602 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 338.
44. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 394.
45. See Librers v. Black, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding
that a man who was not married to the biological mother but who held the child out to
be his own child had standing and remanding for a determination of whether it was an
appropriate action to rebut the presumption).
46. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 394.
47. Id. § 21. Some jurisdictions where the UPA has not been adopted have en
acted provisions declaring that paternity provisions also apply to actions to establish
maternity. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 21 (discussing actions to establish a
mother and child relationship and stating "[i]nsofar as practicable, the provisions of this
chapter applicable to establishing paternity shall apply").
48. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15.
49. Id.
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illegitimacy.5o However, the drafters' allusion to the application of
the presumptions of paternity to maternity claims suggest that sec
tion 201 is not the exclusive means of determining a mother and
child relationship.51
B.

Courts' Central Principles of Determining Parentage

In light of the evolving definitions of parentage and family,
courts are often forced to determine parentage among several per
sons, each of whom has a parental role with the child. 52 In so doing,
courts adhere to several core principles that are fundamental to cur
rent definitions of parentage and family; namely: (1) the impor
tance of the marital relationship and the presumption of
legitimacy;53 (2) the importance of the biological parent-child rei a
tionship;54 (3) the importance of a child having two legal parents;55
and (4) the necessity that the best interests of the child trump all
other considerations.56 Each of these will be discussed in turn.
1.

The Importance of Protecting the Marital Relationship
and Presumption of Legitimacy

At early common law, the presumption of legitimacy-that a
child born into a marital family was a biological child of that
union-was virtually unassailable. 57 The purpose of this presump
tion was to protect children from the stigma of illegitimacy. 58 This
50. See id. § 204.
51. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr (1973) § 21, 9B U.L.A 494.
52. See, e.g., L.A County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In
re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); N.AH. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
53. See generally N.A.H., 9 P.3d at 360 ("[T]he presumption of legitimacy is 'one
of the strongest presumptions known to the law.'" (quoting AG. v. S.G., 609 P.2d 121,
124 (Colo. 1980))).
54. Hill, supra note 21, at 370.
55. Meyer, supra note 20, at 133 (quoting V.c. v. M.J.B., 748 A2d 539, 555 (N.J.
2000)).
56. Andrew S. Epstein, The Parent Trap: Should a Man Be Allowed to Recoup
Child Support Payments If He Discovers He Is Not the Biological Father of the Child?,
42 BRANDEIS L.J. 655, 663 (2004). Other principles have also been noted: "[T]he
mother-child relationship is always seen as primary. The father-child relationships
(whether based in biology or not) are always secondary.... [W]omen's biological ties
to children are seen as largely inseparable from their social ties to children." Susan E.
Dalton, From Presumed Fathers to Lesbian Mothers: Sex Discrimination and the Legal
Construction of Parenthood, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 261, 289 (2003) (citations
omitted).
57. John M. v. Paula T., 571 A2d 1380, 1383-84 (Pa. 1990) (stating that the mari
tal presumption is "one of the strongest presumptions known to law").
58. '''[T]he status "illegitimate" historically subjected a child to significant legal
and social discrimination.'" Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A2d 726, 728 (Pa. 1997)
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presumption was only rebuttable under the four-seas doctrine. 59
This doctrine provided that a child is presumed to be born of the
marriage unless a party submitted proof that the "man was beyond
the reach of both England and the child's mother."60 Therefore, at
English common law, the presumption that a child was conceived
from the marital union was conclusive absent proof showing that
the husband and wife did not cohabit ate at the time of conception.
Currently, the presumption is not as definite as it was under
the common law. 61 However, it remains a foundational principle to
which many courts adhere. 62 American courts have expanded the
available defenses to rebut the presumption of legitimacy beyond
the four-seas doctrine. 63 For example, the presumption may be re
butted by proof that there was no marital cohabitation at the time
of the child's conception,64 proof that the husband was sterile or
impotent,65 or, occasionally, a blood test showing that the husband
(quoting John M., 571 A.2d. at 1383 n.2). There are several reasons for the marital
presumption, including the protection it affords to constitutional privacy and parenting
rights. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 249 (2006); supra text
accompanying notes 24-25. See generally Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) (discussing how it is implicit in parents' Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights that they are to be in charge of parenting decisions); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390,402-03 (1923) (same).
59. Meyer, supra note 20, at 127; Steven N. Peskind, Who's Your Daddy?: An
Analysis of Illinois' Law of Parentage and the Meaning of Parenthood, 35 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 811, 836 (2004).
60. Meyer, supra note 20, at 127; Peskind, supra note 59 ("[T]he four-seas doc
trine, thus provided that 'if a husband, not physically incapable, was within the four seas
of England during the period of gestation, the court would not listen to evidence casting
doubt on his paternity.'" (quoting In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 472 (N.Y. 1930))).
61. c.c. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 1990).
62. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(1) (West 2002)
("A man is presumed to be the biological father of a child if ... [h]e and the child's
biological mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born during
the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment,
or divorce."); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) ("[T]he presumption
of legitimacy is 'one of the strongest presumptions known to the law.''' (quoting A.G. v.
S.G., 609 P.2d 121, 124 (Colo. 1980))).
63. See generally c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 369; Meyer, supra note 20, at 127.
64. Meyer, supra note 20, at 127.
65. Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation
of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 527 (2000).
The [marital] presumption elided the biological facts in an era in which they
were unknowable. The presumption did not apply to cases in which the
mother's husband could not have been the father of his wife's child-cases in
which a man was sterile, impotent, or, in Blackstone's words, "extra quatuor
maria, [beyond the four seas] for above nine months."

2008]

SAY GOODBYE TO DONNA REED

783

could not be the biological father. 66 Notwithstanding these excep
tions, the burden on the party seeking to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy is a heavy one. 67 In addition to the expansion of availa
ble defenses, another difference between the modern and common
law applications of the presumption of legitimacy is that some juris
dictions apply the presumption to children born into same-sex
relationships.68
2.

The Importance of Biology

Biology is particularly important when it comes to parentage
especially maternity.69 Under the UPA, there are many ways for an
alleged father to have standing.7° However, the only ways to estab
lish maternity are by giving birth to the child, legal adjudication, or
adoption.71 These contrasting provisions illustrate the existence of
a strong presumption in favor of using biology in establishing ma
ternity.72 Consider the principle of mater est quam gestation
demonstrate, which means "by gestation the mother is demon
[d. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 457
(1. Chitty ed. 1857».

66. c.c., 550 N.E.2d at 369.
67. See id. (stating that presumption of legitimacy is only rebutted by evidence
that proves "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the husband either did not have access to
the wife during the child's conception, his impotency, or by a blood test that conclu
sively excludes the husband (citing In re J.S.Y., 524 N.E.2d 826, 828-29 (Mass. 1988))).
But see Traci Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relation
ship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 369 (1988) (arguing that if "the putative father ha[s] a
developed relationship with his child ... he may be granted a right of action to rebut
the marital presumption").
68. Appleton, supra note 58, at 228; Allison J. Stone, Comment, "Sisters Are
Doin' It for Themselves!" Why the Parental Rights of Registered Domestic Partners Must
Trump the Parental Rights of Their Known Sperm Donors in California, 41 U.S.F. L.
REV. 505, 523-24 (2007) (explaining that California's Domestic Partnership Rights and
Responsibilities Act of 2003 gives each partner in a same-sex domestic partnership pre
sumed parent status).
69. Hill, supra note 21, at 370.
70. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. A man is a presumed father if he
was married to the mother at the time of the child's conception, birth or shortly after
the birth, or if he resided in the same household as the child and held the child out as
his own. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 204(a)(I)-(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 16-17
(Supp. 2007). A presumed father has standing to maintain a paternity proceeding if he
is the "man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated." Id. § 602(3).
71. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 201(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15.
72. See generally Appleton, supra note 58, 230-31. However, some have argued
that "while gestation may demonstrate maternal status, it is not the sine qua non of
motherhood." HilI, supra note 21, at 370.
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strated."73 Gestation does not create a presumption of maternity,
rather, it demonstrates maternity.7 4
This is significant because, in determining paternity, a man's
biological relationship with the child only creates a presumption of
paternity, it does not demonstrate paternity.75 Moreover, a pre
sumption of fatherhood is more often due to the presumption of
legitimacy, rather than proof of an existence of a biological rela
tionship.7 6 Accordingly, the importance of a biological relationship
with the child, which is given heavy if not dispositive weight in de
terminations of maternity, is significantly less important in paternity
proceedings because paternity is more often linked to the status of
marriage. 77
3.

The Importance of Two Legal Parents

Historically, society and the legal system have recognized the
importance of a two-parent family.78 A two-parent family is legally
important because both individuals provide the child with financial
and emotional support, keeping the child from becoming a ward of
the state. 79 Studies have shown that children from two-parent farni
73. Hill, supra note 21, at 370. In some circumstances gestation will not demon
strate maternity. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding
that the child's legal mother was the biological mother, not the gestational surrogate);
L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a child's sister who raised the child was
her legal mother when the child's biological mother was deceased).
74. Hill, supra note 21, at 370.
75. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2004).
76. Hill, supra note 21, at 372-73; see also Part l.B.1.
77. See Appleton, supra note 58, at 230-31; Dalton, supra note 56, at 289.
78. Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Pater
nity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 834 (2006) (discussing Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380
(1979), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), stating "the Court relied heavily on the two-parent paradigm and chose the
'better' father-a man who had demonstrated greater commitment to the child. The
Court did not consider the possibility of preserving parental rights for two men"). Fur
thermore, the typical "American Family" is considered to be comprised of a husband,
wife, and 2.5 children. Kinna Patel, Comment, Neglecting the Child: The Role of Race
and Sexual Orientation in Adoption Proceedings, 4 J.L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 41, 41
(2002); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 850 (11th ed. 2005)
(defining "nuclear family" as "a family group that consists only of father, mother, and
children"); Silverman, supra note 2, at 417-18 ("The marriage-centered nuclear family
has traditionally served as the bastion for securing American family values ....").
79. Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660, 669 (Cal.
2005). In Elisa B. the court stated, "'whenever possible, a child should have the benefit
of two parents to support and nurture him or her.''' Id. (quoting Librers v. Black, 28
Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005»; see also Alison Harvison Young, Recon
ceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GEN.
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lies are statistically more likely to become high academic achievers,
to have greater access to money, and are less likely to become in
volved in crime than children from one-parent homes. 8o Practically
speaking, some courts have taken the stance that in paternity or
custody determinations "the legal paradigm is that of two legal par
ents."81 In so doing, it is the common goal of these courts to pro
vide the child with two legal parents, a goal for which they will go to
"great lengths" to achieve. 82 Therefore, the two-legal-parents con
cept is more than a mere presumption, it is the starting point for
many courts in determining familial rights.
4.

The Best Interests of the Child

In deciding paternity cases, many courts find that the "best in
terests of the child" are paramount, eclipsing to all other concerns,
including the rights and desires of the other parties involved. 83 Ap
plication of this standard is determined on a case-by-case basis,
often in conjunction with other legal standards, to provide an out
come that is not only in the child's best interest, but is also equita
ble to the other parties involved. 84 In cases where more than one
man is asserting paternity, some courts have used the "best interests
of the child" standard as part of their determination. 85 The best
DER Soc. POL'y & L. 505, 539 (1998) ("[T]he dominant paradigm of the exclusive
family: the child has no more than two parents, leaving the question of who gets cut
out."); Stone, supra note 68, at 516.
80. Karl Zinsmeister, Parental Responsibility and the Future of the American Fam
ily,77 CORNELL L. REV. 1005, 1006-07 (1992). Zinsmeister observed that "[a] major
study by the National Association of Elementary School Principals found that children
from Single-parent families were half as likely to be high academic achievers, compared
to two-parent counterparts, and more than half again as likely to be low achievers." Id.
at 1006. Furthermore, "[sJeventy percent of juveniles now in state reform institutions
grew up in single-parent or no-parent families." Id. at 1007.
81. Meyer, supra note 20, at 133 (quoting V.c. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J.
2000».
82. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional
Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 469 (1990).
83. Epstein, supra note 56, at 663.
84. Id. at 665 (discussing Topper v. Topper, 553 A.2d 639 (Del. 1988) (unpub
lished disposition); Walter v. Gunter, 788 A.2d 609 (Md. 2002».
85. N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 366 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) ("[W]hen presump
tions of paternity arise in more than one potential father, trial courts must take the best
interests of the child into account as part of policy and logic in resolving competing
presumptions."). But see Langston v. Riffe, 754 A.2d 389, 411 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2000) ("A determination of the best interests of the child in ordering the requested
testing, or in the consideration of paternity, whether original or revised, is inappropri
ate."). The standard has also been used to determine if a putative father is allowed to
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interests of the child standard, while unpredictable because of the
judge's vast discretion and reliance on the facts of the case, is often
decisive in any action to establish parentage.
In sum, principles involving the presumption of legitimacy, the
biological parent-child relationship, the two-parent paradigm, and
the best interests of the child standard remain crucial in parentage
determinations. 86 These principles consistently provide guidance in
an area of law that is constantly changing.
C.

Interpretation of the Uniform Parentage Act

Courts have been clear-a legal parent does not necessarily
need to be biologically related to the child. 87 For example, in
Michael H., the Supreme Court held that a biological father of a
child whose natural mother was married to another man during the
child's conception and birth, did not have a constitutionally pro
tected liberty interest in a relationship with the child. 88 Instead, the
mother's husband was held to be the child's legal father. 89 Since
Michael H., courts have declared, under provisions of the UPA, le
gal parentage in persons who have no biological parental relation
ship with the child. 90 This subpart will discuss the four primary
situations in which this happens: (1) surrogacy agreements,91 (4)
persons raising a child to whom they have no biological parental
relationship,92 (3) stepfathers,93 and (4) same-sex coparents. 94
rebut the presumption of legitimacy and order blood tests to determine paternity. Ban
v. Quigley, 812 P.2d 1014, 1017 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
86. Appleton, supra note 58, at 228 (presumption of legitimacy); Hill, supra note
21, at 370 (biology); Jacobs, supra note 78, at 834 (two-parent paradigm); Epstein, supra
note 56, at 663 (best interests of the child).
87. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989); L.A. County
Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 13-14
(Cal. 2004); L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia e. (In re Karen
c.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
88. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124.
89. Id. In Michael H., "[t]he state's policy of treating the marital presumption as
conclusive ... was justified by its interest in protecting both marriage and the child's
established bonds within the intact marital family from external disruption." Meyer,
supra note 20, at 128; see also Stone, supra note 68, at 508.
90. See, e.g., Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salvador
M.), 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (amended
2002), 9B U.L.A. 15 (Supp. 2007); see also In re Karen c., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677.
91. See infra Part I.e.1; see also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993);
Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (Ohio Ct. Com. PI. 1994).
92. See infra Part I.e.2; see also In re Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705; In re
Karen c., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677.
93. See infra Part I.C.3; see also L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v.
Heriberto e. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 6 (Cal. 2004); Alameda County Soc. Servs.
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Surrogacy Agreements

The UPA was amended in 2000 and 2002 to account for ad
vances in medicine and technology, specifically the rise of artificial
reproduction, and to expand the definitions of maternity and pater
nity.95 However, even prior to its amendment, the Supreme Court
of California applied the UPA to a situation that was not consid
ered when it was drafted. 96 In Johnson v. Calvert, the court used
provisions of the UPA to settle a parentage dispute between a hus
band and wife, who were both genetically related to the child, and
the woman who gave birth to the child as a gestational surrogate. 97
Specifically, the court had to determine who the mother was-the
person who gave birth to the child or the other person whose egg
was used in the child's creation and who intended to raise the
child. 98 The court declined to treat this case as one involving con
flicting presumptions of maternity or weigh the evidence of both
parties. 99 The court instead made a legal determination pursuant to
California's UPA provisions that when both the genetic relationship
with the child and gestation of the child do not abide in one woman,
the woman who intended to create and raise the child is the legal
mother. lOO In so doing, the court specifically noted that it was apAgency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932, 934 (Cal. 2002); N.A.H. v.
S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 362 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
94. See infra Part LCA; see also Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County,
117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006).
95. Meyer, supra note 20, at 129.
96. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779.
97. [d. at 782; see also Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that a husband and wife were the legal parents of a child born from their
surrogacy agreement and neither the husband nor the wife was biologically related to
the child). Johnson is significant because the court applied the UPA to a situation that
was unforeseen when it was drafted. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779 ("Passage of the Act
clearly was not motivated by the need to resolve surrogacy disputes, which were virtu
ally unknown in 1975. Yet it facially applies to any parentage determination, including
the rare case in which a child's maternity is in issue.").
98. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779.
99. [d. at 781.
100. [d. at 782; see also Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (Ohio Ct. Com. PI.
1994) (declaring, in a surrogacy situation, the biological parents as legal parents over
the surrogate host and determining that an adoption by the biological parents was not
necessary using a simple genetic standard). See generally Hill, supra note 21, at 370
(stating that traditionally the gestational mother has been determined the legal mother,
however, "while gestation may demonstrate maternal status, it is not the sine qua non
of motherhood .. " It is possible that the common law viewed genetic consanguinity as
the basis for maternal rights .... [G]estation simply would be irrefutable evidence of
the more fundamental genetic relationship" (citations omitted)). Since Johnson v. Cal
vert, the UPA was amended to include that a mother and child relationship could be
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plying the UPA to a situation that was unforeseen when the UPA
was drafted. 1OI The court's determination of a surrogacy agreement
controversy in accordance with the UPA is significant because it
recognized that two women can have standing in a maternity dis
pute and provides an example of how courts have applied the UPA
in situations that were not envisioned by its original drafters. 102

2.

Recognizing Nonbiological Parents

Courts have interpreted the UPA to allow a parent without a
biological relationship with the child to have standing and even to
recognize a parent-child relationship in situations where the parent
and child have a significant familial relationship.lo3 In Librers v.
Black, the court granted standing as a presumed father to Joseph, a
man who lived with the child's biological mother during conception
and held the child out as his own.104 The court examined evidence
that Joseph held the child out as his own, including the fact that
Joseph signed a declaration of paternity, the child had Joseph's last
name, and the child believed Joseph was her father.l° 5 Conse
quently, the court explicitly stated that because Joseph qualified as
a presumed father, the fact that he was not biologically related to
the child had no bearing on the issue of standing. 106
established by "an adjudication confirming the woman as a parent of a child born to a
gestational mother if the agreement was validated under [Article] 8 or is enforceable
under other law." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(4) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15
(Supp. 2007). Other jurisdictions that have not adopted the UPA have reached similar
results. See, e.g., Soos v. Superior Court of Ariz., 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1994)
(holding a statute that granted legal maternity to a surrogate but created a rebuttable
presumption of paternity in the surrogate's husband to be unconstitutional on grounds
of equal protection); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133
(Mass. 2001) (granting the request of the plaintiffs-the genetic parents and the gesta
tional surrogate-to declare the genetic parents the legal parents of the twins and for
the hospital to list their names and not the name of the surrogate on the twins' birth
certificates); Arredondo v. Nodelman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y. 1994) (declaring legal
maternity in the genetic mother, not the gestational mother).
101. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779.
102. Id. "Not uncommonly, courts must construe statutes in factual settings not
contemplated by the enacting legislature." Id.
103. See Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salvador M.), 4
Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs.
v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (granting
standing in a maternity action to the woman who cared for the child and remanding for
a determination of parentage).
104. Librers v. Black, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
105. Id. at 190, 193, 196.
106. /d. at 197.
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Moreover, in Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), the California Court
of Appeal found that a woman with no biological relationship to
the child had standing in a maternity action as a presumed
mother. 107 In Karen c., Karen was born to a married couple who
then gave her to Leticia C. 108 Although she never formally adopted
her, Leticia raised Karen as her own child.1 09 In its decision, the
court interpreted the presumed father provisions of California's
VPA110 to be gender neutral, thus giving Leticia standing as a pre
sumed mother.1 11 The court then remanded the case to the juvenile
court for a determination of whether it was "an appropriate action"
to allow the absence of a genetic relationship to rebut the presump
tion of Leticia's parentage.H 2 Karen C. is significant because it
holds that a parent with no biological relationship to the child, and
no legal relationship through adoption, can have standing and pos
sibly be a legal parent if the court deems it to be an "appropriate
action."1l3 Even more importantly, the court held that paternity
presumptions also apply to maternity actions.114
In addition, in Kern County Department of Human Services v.
Monica G. (In re Salvador M.), the California Court of Appeal al
lowed a child's half-sister to assert standing as a presumed parent
where the half-sister took the child into her home and held herself
out to the child, but not to the rest of her family, as the child's
mother. 115 The court, in stating that "[t]he paternity presumptions
are driven, not by biological paternity, but by the state's interest in
the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family," interpreted
107. In re Karen c., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677.
lOS. Id. at 677-7S. The biological mother told the hospital that she was Leticia so
that Leticia's name would be on Karen's birth certificate. Id. at 67S.
109. Id. Leticia never formally adopted Karen. Id.
110. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2004).
111. In re Karen c., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677. "Insofar as practicable, the provi
sions of this part applicable to the father and child relationship apply [to the mother
and child relationship]." CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a).
112. In re Karen c., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 6S1. The court had significant deference
to hold a case to be an appropriate action to allow a rebuttal of the presumption of
paternity, or in this case maternity. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salvador M.), 4
Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 70S (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The court first stated that she had standing
because she was an aggrieved party in the preceding action. Id. Subsequently the court
stated that she openly held the child out to be her own after the child's biological
mother had passed away. Id. at 70S-09.
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the UPA to be gender neutral. 116 The court reasoned that the
child's half-sister was a presumed parent because the child "be
lieved" that the half-sister was his mother, and the fact that other
people knew otherwise did not rebut her status as a presumed par
ent. 117 Furthermore, the court held that this was not appropriate
for the presumption of parentage to be rebutted because to do so
would render the child without a family, and maintaining the famil
ial relationship is a compelling state interest. 118 In summary,
Librers, Karen c., and Salvador M. are significant because they
hold that biology is not the determinative factor when establishing
standing in maternity actions where there are no competing claims
to parentage.1 19
3.

Stepfathers

A stepfather is held to be a presumed father under the UPA in
two ways: either by "receiv[ing] the child into his home and openly
hold[ing] out the child as his natural child"120 or by benefiting from
the presumption of legitimacy.l2l For example, if a wife conceives a
child through an extramarital relationship, her husband will be con
sidered a presumed father under the UPA if he is either married to
the wife at the time of conception, or receives the child into his
home and openly holds the child out as his natural child. 122
In interpreting the UPA, courts have held that neither the pre
sumption of legitimacy nor the presumption of biology is conclu
sive.1 23 This nonconclusiveness is further demonstrated by the fact
that a stepfather's admission that he has no biological connection to
the child does not automatically rebut the presumption.124
An example of a court granting a stepfather standing can be
seen in Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
116.
117.
118.

/d. at 708.
Id. at 708-09.
/d. at 709.

119. Librers v. Black, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); In re Salva
dor M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 708-09; In re Karen c., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681.
120. VNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 4(a)(4) (1973), 9B V.L.A. 394 (2001).
121. Id. § 4(a)(1).
122. VNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 204(a)(1), (5) (amended 2002), 9B V.L.A. 16-17
(Supp. 2007).
123. L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa
V.), 85 P.3d 2,14 (Cal. 2004); Alameda County Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In
re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932, 933-34 (Cal. 2002); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 362 (Colo.
2000) (en banc).
124. In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 933-34.
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Services v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V. ).125 In that case, Jesusa was
born to her mother and her biological father, Heriberto C.1 26 Dur
ing Jesusa's conception her mother was living with Heriberto, not
with her husband, Paul. 127 The action was brought when Heriberto
raped and battered Jesusa's mother. 128 This incident placed
Jesusa's mother in the hospital and Heriberto in jail.1 29 Paul took
Jesusa in and petitioned for paternity.130 Subsequently, Heriberto
also petitioned for paternity.l3l The court determined that both
Heriberto and Paul fulfilled the statutory requirement of a pre
sumed father under California Family Code section 7611 and
granted both men standing. 132

At trial, the court weighed the competing interests and held
that Paul's presumption was indeed greater. 133 The court deter
mined that Paul had a substantial relationship with Jesusa: he had
been married to her mother for eighteen years, he was the father of
her five half-siblings, Jesusa stayed with him almost every weekend,
and both she and her mother resided with him when her mother
was having difficulties with Heriberto. 134 The court further stated
that Heriberto's interests were merely bioiogicaP35 and not in
Jesusa's best interests.B6 The court agreed with the juvenile court
that" 'there is so much more to being a father than merely planting
the biological seed. The man who provides stability, nurturance,
family ties, permanence, is more important to a child than the man
who has mere biological ties.' "137
The Colorado Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in
N.A.H. v. S.L.S.138 In N.A.H., S.R.H. was born to her biological
mother during her ongoing marriage.B9 The husband's name was
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 29. Family Services had filed a dependency petition to remove Jesusa

based on Heriberto's abuse of her mother, claiming that Jesusa witnessed that abuse
and that their home was unsuitable to live in. Id. at 6.
137. Id. at 15 (quoting the juvenille court's unreported opinion).
138. N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
139. Id. at 357.
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placed on the birth certificate and he accepted the child into his
home and held her out as his own child. 140 However, during the
time that S.R.H. was conceived, her mother was having an extra
marital affair with the biological father. 141 When the mother and
husband reconciled, the mother terminated the biological father's
visitation and the biological father sued for paternity.1 42 Genetic
testing proved that the husband was not the biological father. 143
However, the court granted both the biological father and the hus
band standing and held that "a question of paternity is not automat
ically resolved by biological testing, but rather calls upon the courts
to consider the best interests of the child in analyzing policy and
logic as directed by the statute."144 The case was then remanded
for a determination of whether it was in the best interests of the
child to allow the genetic evidence to rebut the presumption of le
gitimacy.145 In re Jesusa V. and N.A.H. are important because the
courts interpreted the UPA to allow a stepfather, who undeniably
had no biological connection to the child, to have standing as a pre
sumed parent and could be determined to be the legal parent. 146
4.

Same-Sex Parents

A significant step in· the evolution of defining parentage has
involved cases where a same-sex coparent has petitioned for mater
nity.147 In Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, Califor
nia's one-mother principle was challenged by a lesbian coparent,
Emily, who wanted her former partner, Elisa, to be declared a legal
parent to her biological children. 148 Emily and Elisa planned to
build a family together and to have children by artificial insemina
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 358.
143. Id. at 359.
144. Id. at 357. Other courts have come to similar conclusions. Id. at 361 n.5.
(citing Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe, 963 P.2d 1135,1155 (Haw. Ct. App.
1998); Witso v. Overby (In re Witso), 609 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000);
K.E.N. v. R.c. (In re K.E.N.), 513 N.W.2d 892, 897 (N.D. 1994».
145. Id. at 366.
146. L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa
V.), 85 P.3d 2, 11, 15-16 (Cal. 2004); N.A.H., 9 P.3d at 358, 361.
147. These cases fly in the face of California's principle that a child can only have
one mother. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (one-mother
principle).
148. Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal.
2005).
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tion,149 Moreover, they chose the same donor so that their children
would be biologically related. 150 Elisa gave birth to Chance, and
Emily gave birth to twins, Ry and Kaia.1 51 The children were raised
as siblings and referred to both Emily and Elisa as their mothers.1 52
When Emily and Elisa separated, the trial court initially ordered
Elisa to pay child support to Emily and the twins.153 The California
Court of Appeal dismissed the suit and stated that "Elisa had no
obligation to pay child support because she was not a parent of the
twins within the meaning of the Uniform Parentage ACt."154
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed, holding
that a child can have two mothers.1 55 The court came to this con
clusion by factually distinguishing the case from Johnson. 156 In
Johnson, three potential parents had stepped forward-the biologi
cal father, the biological mother, and the gestational mother
whereas in this case only two parents had stepped forward, and the
issue was whether the child's two legal parents could both be wo
men.1 57 The court proceeded to apply a gender-neutral reading of
California Family Code section 7611 and determined that Elisa had
"received the twins into her home and openly held them out as her
natural children. "158 The significance of this decision is twofold: It
dispensed with the principle that a child can only have one legal
mother 159 and it applied a gender-neutral interpretation of Califor
nia Family Code section 7611 to recognize a woman as a presumed
parent. 160
149. Id. at 663.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 662-63.
152. Id. at 663.
153. Id. at 664.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 666.
156. Id.; see supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993)).
157. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666.
158. Id. at 667; see also Jacobs, supra note 78, at 819 ("More recently, courts have
applied the intent test to legalize the parentage of non-biological lesbian co-parents. ").
159. See generally Manternache, supra note 32, at 401. In deciding Johnson, the
court adhered to the two-parent family principle in that "the facts of the Johnson case
are distinguishable from a situation where a non biological lesbian mother is vying for a
parentage determination .... [In Johnson] a determination of parentage of the surro
gate mother would have given the child three parents from two separate families." Id.
(citations omitted).
160. See Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 337 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(reversing the trial court's determination that a same-sex parent lacked standing be
cause, under Elisa B., a former same-sex coparent may be able to establish parentage
via a gender-neutral application of CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2004) if the parent
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AMY G. v. M. W.

Despite the aforementioned decisions declaring parentage in
persons who were not biologically related to the child, the court in
Amy G. refrained from interpreting the UPA to be gender neutral
and refused a stepmother's request to have standing in a maternity
case. 161 In Amy G., the court held that Amy G., as a stepmother,
did not have standing because the child's biological mother was also
asserting maternity.162 In effect, this denied stepmothers the right
to notice and opportunity to be heard in parentage determinations,
a right that has been afforded to stepfathers for years. 163 This Part
details the facts and procedural posture of the case, the arguments
presented by both parties, and the court's reasoning.
A.

Facts and Procedural Posture

Nathan was born in May 2003, to his father (G.G.) and biologi
cal mother (M.W.).l64 At the time of Nathan's conception and
throughout his gestational period, G.G. was married to Amy G.1 65
For the first month of Nathan's life, he resided with M.W. in Vir
ginia. 166 In June 2003, his father traveled from California to Vir
ginia to take Nathan to live with him.1 67 During this visit, M.W.
signed a custody and adoption agreement providing that G.G.
would have sole custody, M.W. would not have any rights to visitareceived the child into her home and openly held the child out as her own). Other
courts have interpreted parentage statutes to legally recognize the parentage of same
sex couples. See, e.g., In Re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A2d 1036 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 2005) (holding that a same-sex parent of a child born to her partner via artificial
insemination is a legal mother using a gender-neutral application of the Artificial In
semination Statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2002)); Carvin v. Britain (In re
Parentage of L.B.), 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2021 (2006) (hold
ing that a same-sex parent had standing for a determination of coparentage where the
child was only biologically related to her former partner).
161. Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 309-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review
denied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29,2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 2252 (2007).
162. [d. at 310.
163. See generally L.A County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C.
(In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2004); Alameda County Soc. Servs. Agency v.
Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932, 933-34 (Cal. 2002); N.AH. v. S.L.S., 9
P.3d 354, 354-55 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
164. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 298-99.
165. Id. at 299. G.G. and M.W. had been involved in an extramarital relation
ship. Id.
166.
167.

[d.

Id.
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tion, and M.W. would consent to Amy G. adopting Nathan. 168
From that point on, Nathan resided with his father and Amy G.169
In September 2003, M.W. filed a petition against G.G. seeking
to establish a parental relationship with Nathan. 170 G.G. then re
quested a judgment of parentage to recognize Amy G. as Nathan's
legal mother and filed a motion to join Amy G. as a necessary party
to the action pI After G.G.'s request to join Amy G. was denied,
Amy G. filed a separate petition to contest maternity as an inter
ested person pursuant to California Family Code section 7650(a).l72
The trial court granted M.W.'s motion to quash and dismissed Amy
G.'s action. 173 Amy G. and G.G. appealed this decision. 174 While
Amy G. was pursuing her own action, G.G. again moved to join
Amy G. to the action commenced by M.Wps When the trial court
denied G.G's motion to join Amy G., he filed a petition for a writ
of prohibition seeking to vacate the trial court's order and to allow
Amy G. to join the actionP6 The California Court of Appeal con
solidated the appeal from Amy G.'s action and G.G.'s petition in
M.W.'s action.177 On August 17, 2006, the court filed its decision
denying Amy G. and G.G.'s motion and petition. 178 Amy G. and
G.G.'s subsequent petition for review was denied on November 29,
2006. 179 Furthermore, their writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court was also denied. I80

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

[d.
[d. at 300.
[d.
[d.
[d. "Any interested person may bring an action to determine the existence
or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship." CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a) (West

2004). On February 9, 2004, M.W. received monitored visitation with Nathan for four
hours per week. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 300.
173. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 300.
174.
175.

[d.
[d. G.G. also sought to join Steven, M.W's husband at the time of Nathan's

conception and birth. However, Steven filed a responsive declaration in which he
stated that he had no desire to become a party to the action and would sign a waiver
relinquishing his rights to a paternity claim. Id. at 300-01.
176. Id. at 299-300.
177. Id. at 299.
178.

Id.

179. Amy G. v. M.W., No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29,2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2252 (2007).

180.

Amy G. v. M.W., 127 S. Ct. 2252 (2007).
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Plaintiffs' Arguments

Amy G. and G.G. presented several arguments concerning
why Amy G. should have been afforded standing or joined as a
necessary party to the action. First, they contended that Amy G.
should have been treated similarly to a stepfather and granted
standing under a gender-neutral application of the UPA.181 Sec
ond, they argued that maternity determinations, like paternity deci
sions, should not be decided solely on the basis of biology.182
Finally, they asserted that the court should have decided the issue
of Amy G.'s standing before discussing the merits of the action.l 83
1.

Amy G.'s Situation Is Analogous to that of a Stepfather

Amy G. and G.G. argued that Amy G. should have been
granted standing because, since she was married to the child's bio
logical father at the time of Nathan's conception,184 her situation
was analogous to one in which a stepfather would be joined in an
action for paternity.l85 Because of the marital presumption, stepfa
thers have standing by proof of marriage to the biological mother
during the child's conception. 186 Since Amy G.'s situation is similar
to that of stepfathers who have been afforded standing, Amy G.
should have been granted standing under a gender-neutral interpre
tation of the UPA.l87
Furthermore, Amy G. and G.G. argued that it is practical to
apply the presumed father statutes to maternity actions. 188 This ar
gument is one of statutory construction. California Family Code
section 7650 states that paternity provisions apply equally to mater
181. See Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 301, 303-04.
182. Appellants' Reply Brief at 16, Amy G. v. M.W., 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215
(Cal. 2006) (No. S146841).
183. Petition for Review at 35-37, Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (Nos. B182101, B187828).
184. See Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 182, at 7.
185. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 302 (stating that joinder is required when "that
person's absence from the action could impair that person's interest"). In addition,
they argued that Amy G. should have standing as an interested person "because she
claim[ed] to be Nathan's mother." Id. Any "interested person" has standing in a ma
ternityaction. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650 (West 2004).
186. See Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 182, at 6-7; see also L.A. County
Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 11 (Cal.
2004).
187. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 302-03. The portions of the UPA that apply to
paternity are equally applicable to maternity. Id. (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a)
(West 2004)).
188. Petition for Review, supra note 183, at 22 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650).
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nity provisions, "[i]nsofar as practicable."189 Amy G. argued, "If
the legislature had intended birth mothers to always prevail in ma
ternity cases involving competing claims, it could have said so with
clarity and precision, rather than incorporating the presumed-father
laws into maternity law by reference."190 Therefore, because prac
ticability does not require that biology trump other considerations
in maternity actions, requiring such an effect ignores that the stat
ute clearly states that paternity provisions apply to maternity
determinations. I91
Additionally, Amy G. and G.G. argued that Amy G. should
have had standing under a gender-neutral application of the UPA
because she should benefit from the presumption of legitimacy.I92
Under that presumption, codified in California Family Code section
7611, Nathan is presumed to be a child of the intact marriage.1 93
Therefore, Amy should have a claim to custody and thus should be
joined. I94
2.

Biology Is Not Determinative

Amy G. and G.G. argued that Amy G. should have been
granted standing because biology and gender are not determinative
of legal parentage. They stated,
Because biological parenthood is not required for a man to have
standing to assert his legal parentage, and to win recognition as a
legal parent over the claims of a biological father, the absence of
biological ties can't bar a similarly-situated woman from stand
ing, and from winning recognition of her legal parenthood over
the claims of a biological mother. I95

Furthermore, they argued that in In re Nicholas H. and In re Jesusa
V., biology was not the deciding factor in nonsurrogacy cases. I96
Therefore, biology should not have been the deciding factor in this
case. I97
189. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650.
190. Petition for Review, supra note 183, at 22.
191.
192.
193.
194.

ld.
Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303.
ld.
See id.
195. Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 182, at 16.
196. ld. at 18; see also L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Her
iberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 14 (Cal. 2004); Alameda County Soc. Servs.
Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932, 933-34 (Cal. 2002).
197. See Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 182, at 16.
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Standing Should Have Been Decided Before the Merits

The court held that Amy G. lacked standing because she could
not be Nathan's mother.1 98 In so doing, Amy G. and G.G. declared
that the court decided the issue of standing by deciding the merits
of the claim. 199 This decision denied Amy G. notice and an oppor
tunity to be heard on the merits of her claim.20o They stated that
this is contrary to prior California case law in which persons with a
fostered parental relationship have standing to be heard at a trial
on the merits. 201 Thus, Amy G. and G.G. argued that the court
should have granted Amy G., the woman who had raised Nathan
since infancy, standing so that her views could be heard before a
decision was rendered on the merits. 202
C.

Defendant's Arguments

M.W. argued that the court was correct in holding that Amy G.
did not have standing and could not be joined as a necessary party
because all of Amy G. and G.G.'s claims were grounded in the as
sertion that Amy G. could be Nathan's mother. 203 Since M.W.'s
biological maternity was uncontested, she stated that Amy G. could
not be a presumed mother under California Family Code section
7611 because under California law a child can only have one
mother. 204
M.W. argued that it is consistent, in light of the UPA's purpose
of preventing unequal treatment of children based on their parents'
marital status, to treat biological mothers differently than biological
fathers.205 She discussed how there is an innate difference between
biological fathers and biological mothers in that "[w]here a child is
born out of wedlock, the identity of the father is often unclear. The
198. See Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307.
199. Petition for Review, supra note 183, at 36 ("The result of that holding is that
trial courts can determine ... that a party's claim to parental status has no merit, with
out first joining the claimant as a party.").
200. Id. at 35.
201. Id. at 36 (citing Perez v. Dep't of Health, 138 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977)); see also L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re
Karen C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
202. Petition for Review, supra note 183, at 36.
203. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303.
204. /d. at 304.
205. Respondent's Brief and Brief in Further Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Prohibition at 22, Amy G. v. M.W., 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. 2006) (No. S146841)
[hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
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identity of the mother is seldom unclear."206 Since biological ma
ternity is almost always certain, the only situation that warrants
granting standing in a maternity case to a nonbiological mother is
when the biological mother is not asserting her claim.207
D.

The Court's HoLding

The court distinguished the cases upon which Amy G. and
G.G. relied, holding that this was not a situation where the court
should apply the presumptions of paternity to women. 208 The court
held that both In re Karen C. 209 and In re SaLvador M.21O were dis
tinguishable because in those cases there was no competing claim to
maternity.211 The court also held that ELisa B. was distinguishable
because, in that case, the Supreme Court of California only recog
nized two parents (although both of them were women).212 In this
case, the court would have had to recognize three parents: G.G.,
Amy G., and M.W.213
Furthermore, the court determined that In re Jesusa V. was not
applicable to this case, because there were no competing claims of
maternity since M.W. was Nathan's biological mother. 214 Structur
ally, there is no framework in the UPA to weigh competing claims
of maternity like there is for competing claims of paternity.2Is This
is due to the fact that where the biological relationship of the
mother is uncontested, maternity is determined. 216
In light of the arguments proposed by each of the parties, the
court decided that Amy G. did not have standing. 217 The court
based its decision in the fact that the identity of Nathan's biological
maternity was not contested. 218 Therefore Amy G. could not be
206. [d. at 23 (emphasis omitted).
207. See id.
208. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 304.
209. L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen
C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
210. Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salvador M.), 4
Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
211. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 304.
212. [d. at 305; see Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660
(Cal. 2005).
213. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305.
214. [d. at 306; L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C.
(In re Jesusa Y.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
215. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2004).
216. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306.
217. [d. at 309-10.
218. [d.
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Nathan's mother or presumed mother. 219 However, this Note ar
gues that Amy G. should have received standing through a gender
neutral interpretation of the UPA because courts should not treat
her any differently from stepparents or same-sex coparents who are
in similar situations.

III.

A

STEPMOTHER CAN HAVE STANDING IN A MATERNITY

SUIT THROUGH A GENDER-NEUTRAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE

ACT

This Part considers why Amy G. should have received standing
as an interested person through a gender-neutral application of the
UPA. This issue is important for several reasons. First, if gender
roles were reversed, a stepfather would have had standing. 220 For
example, a stepfather would have had standing in a paternity action
where the child was a result of his wife's extramarital affair with the
biological father, and the stepfather had taken the child into his
home and held the child out as his own. 221 Thus, but for Amy G.
being a woman, she would have been granted standing. Second, if
Amy G. had no biological relationship with Nathan, but had taken
care of the child all of his life and there were no other possible
parental figures, Amy G. would have standing in a maternity ac
tion. 222 Third, a same-sex coparent petitioning for maternity of a
child born to her partner through alternative reproduction technol
ogy would have standing. 223 Finally, if the court had granted Amy
G. standing, the door would have been opened for other stepmoth
ers to have standing in maternity actions.
This Note argues that there is no difference between stepmoth
ers and stepfathers, same-sex coparents, and persons who have no
biological relationship to the child but have cared for the child as
219. Id. at 310.
220. See generally L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C.
(In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2004); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en
banc).
221. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 7.
222. Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica O. (In re Salvador M.), 4
Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs.
v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (remanding an
order that denied a child's petition for a mother-child relationship where the child was
taken in and cared for by a nonrelative woman).
223. Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005)
(holding that Elisa B., as the biological mother's partner, was a presumed parent to
Emily's biological children Ry and Kaia, who were conceived using a sperm donor,
because she actively participated in causing the children'S conception, accepted the obli
gations of parenthood, and no competing claims of a second parent existed).
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the sole parental figure. This analysis will focus solely on Amy G.'s
standing to assert her claim for maternity and to be joined as an
interested party.224 Part lILA discusses how Nathan can have three
parents for the purposes of standing and how the court should have
distinguished between the issues of standing and the merits of the
action. Part IILB discusses how biology is not conclusive in parent
age determinations and should not automatically govern when de
termining standing in maternity actions. Part IILe compares Amy
G.'s case with Elisa B. and leads to the conclusion that Nathan can
have two mothers for the purposes of standing. Part IILD analyzes
how the marital presumption is applied with a gender bias and de
termines that it should be applied equally when the husband is bio
logically related to the child and the wife is not, as when the wife is
biologically related to the child and the husband is not. Finally,
Part IILE analyzes how courts can weigh both Amy G.'s claim as a
224. This Note does not discuss whether Amy G. would have been declared Na
than's legal mother if she were determined to have standing, if the court should have
recognized and declared that Nathan had two legal mothers, or if the court's decision
violated Amy G.'s procedural due process or equal protection rights under the Four
teenth Amendment. See generally Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307-08 (holding that the
denial of Amy G.'s standing and joinder claims did not violate her rights under the
Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). This Note
does not discuss other legal options that stepparents-or others with a parental rela
tionship with a child-can pursue to acquire certain rights regarding custody and visita
tion with the child. See generally, e.g., Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), 122
P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2021 (2006) (acknowledging the common
law status of a de facto parent as a person who has performed a parent-like role in the
child's life, and with that status has standing to petition the court for other rights and
obligations associated with parentage); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and
One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50
BUFF. L. REV. 341, 359-63 (2002) (discussing how courts have used the psychological
parent status and the parent-like relationship status to accord visitation rights to nonbi
ological lesbian coparents); Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't
Know Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 865 (2003) (discussing the rights acquired with the quasi-parent status); Survey of
2004-2005 Developments in Alabama Caselaw, 57 ALA. L. REV. 567, 613 (2005) (dis
cussing the new requirements adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court to acquire in
loco parentis status, "[fjirst, the non-parent must, without legally adopting a child, as
sume parental obligations. Second, the non-parent must voluntarily provide for the
child" (citing Smith v. Smith, 922 So. 2d 94 (Ala. 2005) (footnotes omitted))). Further
more, this Note does not address how a parent may be estopped from petitioning for a
paternity determination. See generally, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 52 P.3d 255 (Haw. 2002)
(holding that a mother was estopped from filing a petition for paternity where she had
affirmatively asserted that the presumed father was the natural father of her child); In
re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 2001) (holding that a father was estopped
from setting aside a judgment of paternity when he had voluntarily acknowledged pa
ternity five years prior to the genetic determination that he was not the biological
father).
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presumed mother and M.W.'s claim as a biological mother through
a gender-neutral reading of the UPA's paternity provisions. This
analysis leads to the conclusion that a stepmother should be granted
the same rights as a stepfather or same-sex coparent, and should
have standing in a maternity action through a gender-neutral inter
pretation of the UPA.
A.

Nathan Can Have Three Parents for the Purposes of Standing

In Amy G., the court decided that Amy G. did not have stand
ing because she could not be Nathan's mother. 225 In so doing, the
court decided the issues of standing and maternity simultaneously.
This subpart proposes that the court should have (1) distinguished
between standing and the determination of parentage, and (2)
found that Amy G. was an interested person and should have been
given standing or joined in the maternity action.
1.

The California Court Should Have Distinguished
Between Standing and the Parentage
Determination

The court should have first determined whether Amy G. had
standing and, if she did, then determined whether she could be Na
than's mother. 226 The court's decision in Amy G. was simple: Amy
G. cannot have standing because she cannot be Nathan's mother. 227
The result of this determination was that the court decided the mer
its of the case before deciding standing. 228 This denied Amy G. no
tice and opportunity to be heard, which has been afforded to others
in similar situations where courts recognized three potential parents
for the purposes of standing only and then made a legal maternity
determination at trial.2 29
225. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 310.
226. It is common practice for issues of standing to be decided before the merits.
See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119-21 (1989) (holding that a biological
father did not have standing when he moved for a blood test of a child born into an
intact marriage, between the biological mother and her husband, because the only ones
who could bring the paternity action under section 621 of the California Evidence Code
were the husband or wife).
227. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 310.
228. See Petition for Review, supra note 183, at 36.
229. See id.; see also L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto
C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en
banc).
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By declaring that Amy G. did not have standing because she
could not be Nathan's mother, the court decided the
merits of the action, not standing

As a general principle, the issue of standing must be decided
before a court hears the merits of a particular action.230 In Librers
v. Black, the California Court of Appeal decided that the district
court had erred by deciding the case on the merits without first de
termining standing-in effect "putting the cart before the horse. "231
In Librers, the district court denied standing to a man who was liv
ing with the child's mother, who was married to another man during
conception, "for the very reason that it had already determined that
[he] was not a presumed father. "232 In doing so, the district court
looked at two factors: "biology [and] depth of bond."233 However,
the factors to determine whether a man is a presumed father in
clude more than biology and depth of bond, such as being married
to the mother at the time of conception and openly holding the
child out as one's own child. 234 Therefore the California Court of
Appeal reversed because the man had produced adequate evidence
that he held the child out as his own. The court held that he did
have standing, and remanded for a determination of legal
paternity.235
However, in denying Amy G. standing, the California Court of
Appeal used similar reasoning as the district court in Librers .236
The Amy G. court said that the "father and Amy's arguments are
all predicated on Amy's claim that she is Nathan's mother. There
fore our threshold question is whether Amy can assert status as Na
230. Librers v. Black, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) ("A litigant's
standing to sue is a threshold issue to be resolved before the matter can be reached on
the merits." (quoting Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Servs. of L.A., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 474,
479 (2005))); accord Said v. Jegan, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
231. Librers, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 197.
232. [d.
233. [d. at 195.
234. [d.; see supra Part 1.B.1-.3 (discussing the importance of the marital pre
sumption, the two-parent paradigm, and biology in parentage determinations).
235. Librers, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 197.
236. Compare Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
("Because Amy cannot legally be Nathan's mother under these circumstances, Amy
cannot 'c\aim[] an interest relating to the subject of the action ....'" (quoting CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 389(a) (West 2004))), review denied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS
14215 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2252 (2007), with Librers, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 195 (stating that the court relied on "biology or depth of bond," which was
unrelated to standing but related to the merits).
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than's mother."237 The court stated that a reason to deny Amy G.
standing was, if she had standing, she would ultimately lose on the
merits.238 Similar to Librers, the issue should not have been
whether Amy G. could assert status as Nathan's mother or whether
she could win at trial, it should have been whether she could assert
status as a presumed mother. 239 By predicating its analysis on
whether Amy G. could be Nathan's mother, the court put the cart
before the horse and decided standing by determining the merits of
the action.240
b.

The court should have granted all three parents standing and
made a legal determination of maternity at trial

Amy G., G.G., and M.W. should all have had standing and Na
than's two legal parents should have been determined at trial. In
paternity cases where a stepfather asserts a claim that opposes the
claim of a biological father, courts have granted both men standing
and determined who the child's two legal parents are from the three
possible parents. 241 For example, in In re Jesusa V., the court al
lowed both Paul, Jesusa's stepfather, and Heriberto, her biological
father, to have standing in a paternity action.242 The court found
that Paul and Heriberto were presumed fathers under California
Family Code section 7611.243 The identity of Jesusa's biological
parents was not at issue and, therefore, she had three potential par
ents for the purposes of standing: her mother, Paul, and Heriberto.
Both presumed fathers were first granted standing and later given
an opportunity to be heard at trial where the juvenile court consid
ered the paternity claims on their merits and determined which pre
237. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303.
238. Respondent's Brief, supra note 205, at 40 ("The trial court thus believed that
even ilhe found that Amy qualified as a presumptive parent under section 7611, subdi
vision (d), her claim would be defeated by section 7612 because Kim is both the biologi
cal mother and did not wait a long time to assert per parentage rights." (citing CAL.
FAM. CODE §§ 7611(d), 7612 (1993».
239. Cf Librers, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 195 ("The relevant inquiry under the statute
is whether the prospective plaintiff claiming presumed father status under section 7611,
subdivision (d) can allege facts that bring him within the statutory language of that
subdivision"). For Amy G. to assert status as a presumed mother, the court would have
had to interpret the UPA to be gender neutral under California Family Code section
7650(a). See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a).
240. Librers, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 197.
241. See generally L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C.
(In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs.
v. Mario A. (In re Kiana A.), 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 675-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
242. In re Jesusa
85 P.3d at 11.
243. Id. at 7.

v.,
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sumption was weightier pursuant to California Family Code section
7611.244 The result in In re Jesusa V. was not an isolated incident.
Many other courts have recognized that two men can concurrently
qualify as presumed fathers, where the natural mother was not con
tested, and granted both standing for the determination of who was
the child's legal father. 245
The situation in Amy G. is virtually identical to In re Jesusa V.
Nathan has three potential parents for the purposes of standing: his
father, Amy G., and M.W. The only difference between these two
cases is that the gender roles are reversed. 246 However, a gender
role reversal does not warrant opposite treatment in regard to
standing. 247 In granting standing to stepfathers while denying the
same to a similarly situated stepmother, the court is effectively say
ing that one has a greater interest in the child because of gender
differences. The court should have avoided this inequitable result
by treating Amy G. like Paul in In re Jesusa V. by granting her
standing as an interested party, and subsequently determining
whether Amy G. or M.W. is Nathan's legal mother by weighing the
two claims.

244. Id. at 7-8. It should be noted that Heriberto was not present at the trial
because he was in jail. Id. at 8.
245. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (determining parent
age of a child whose conception was arranged through a surrogacy agreement using the
husband's sperm and carried by a donor; the husband, wife, and donor were all granted
standing and the final determination pronounced the husband and wife to be the legal
parents); In re Kiana A., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675-76 (granting standing to two men who
fulfilled the requirements for the presumption of paternity, where the mother of the
child was not contested). Moreover, "Although more than one individual may fulfill
the criteria that give rise to a presumption of paternity, there can be only one presumed
father." Id. (citing Brian C. v. Ginger K, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000».
246. Compare Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(stepmother asserting maternity where a child was conceived through her husband's
extramarital affair with the biological mother), review denied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal.
LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2252 (2007), with In re Jesusa
V., 85 P.3d at 6-7 (stepfather asserting paternity where a child was conceived through
his wife's extramarital affair with the biological father). An additional difference is that
Heriberto was incarcerated during these proceedings and was unable to care for Jesusa.
This fact, however, has no relation to standing. Id. at 7. Furthermore, Paul and Jesusa's
mother, his wife, had lived apart for three years preceding Jesusa's birth, whereas Amy
G. and Nathan's father had not spent any time apart. Id.
247. It is a violation of a person's equal protection rights if treatment differs
solely on the basis of gender and if the classification does not serve" 'important govern
mental objectives'" and the means are not" 'substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.''' United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982».
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Furthermore, consideration of three parents for the purposes
of standing would not be antithetical to the two-parent paradigm. 248
In this situation, the court could determine Nathan's two legal par
ents at trial using the best interests of the child standard. 249 Thus,
while the two-parent paradigm would not apply to standing, it
would be the mold used at trial. Therefore, the state's interest in a
child having two legal parents would be protected. 250
However, the court in Amy G. found that In re Jesusa V. was
not analogous because there were not two conflicting presump
tions. 251 The court stated that M.W., the biological mother, had
standing under the maternity statute252 and, as such, was not a pre
sumed parent so it could not weigh the two claims.253 This argu
ment is again predicated on the differential treatment of
stepparents based on gender. In In re Jesusa v., Heriberto and Paul
were both presumed fathers and as such both independently had
standing independently.254 It is conceded that M.W. has standing
under California Family Code section 7650(b) because she gave
birth to Nathan.255 However, Amy G. should also have standing as
a presumed parent under a gender-neutral application of California
Family Code sections 7611(a) and (d).256 Other than the gender of
the parties, there is no difference between Heriberto and M.W.-as
biological parents-or between Paul and Amy G.-as stepparents.
If gender is ignored, the differences become semantic, and, by ap
plying paternity provisions to maternity claims, any differences be
come nonexistent. 257 Therefore, both M.W. and Amy G. should
have independent standing to assert a claim. Once they have stand
ing, the court may choose either to treat their claims like conflicting
presumptions of paternity,258 or to devise a different method of
weighing M.W.'s interest as the biological mother and Amy G.'s
248. See supra Part I.B.3.
249. See supra Part I.B.4.
250. See Jacobs, supra note 78, at 834; Meyer, supra note 20, at 133.
251. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306 (stating that M.W.'s maternity is established
by giving birth to Nathan; thus, the court stated she is not a presumed parent).
252. [d. (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West 2004)).
253. [d.; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(b).
254. L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa
V.), 85 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2004). Heriberto had a rebuttable presumption under California
Family Code section 7611(d) and Paul had a rebuttable presumption under sections
7611(a) and (d). [d.
255. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306.
256. But see id. at 304.
257. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 21 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 494 (2001).
258. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b).
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presumption as a stepmother. 259 Either way, Amy G. should be af
forded the chance to assert her claim. Denying her this opportunity
treats her differently solely on the basis of gender, and it decides
the issue of standing on the merits of the action without giving Amy
G. an opportunity to be heard.
2.

A Stepmother Is a Presumed Parent, Is an Interested
Person in a Maternity Suit, and Should Have
Standing

It would be consistent with the UPA to determine that Amy G.

is a presumed parent under a gender-neutral reading of California
Family Code section 7611. 260 The Amy G. court held that because
Amy G. could not be Nathan's natural mother or presumed mother,
she could not be made a party.261 The court began with the pre
sumption that the "father and Amy's arguments all are predicated
on Amy's claim [that] she is Nathan's mother."262 As noted above,
this unwisely conflates the issues of standing and success on the
merits. If the court had separated these issues, Amy G. could have
argued that she should have been afforded standing because she
was entitled to a presumption of maternity through a gender-neu
tral reading of the UPA. Amy G.'s argument that she was Nathan's
mother went to the merits of the action and should not have been
part of the consideration of standing. 263
In the case of N.A.H., for example, the Colorado Supreme
Court granted both a biological father and a husband standing in a
paternity action, where a child was conceived through a wife's ex
tramarital affair. 264 The husband did not claim that he was the bio
logical father. 265 Rather, he asserted that he benefited from two
presumptions of paternity under the UPA, and that the court
should decide what was in the best interest of the child in determin
259. See discussion infra Part III.E.
260. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611.
261. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307-08.
262. [d. at 303.
263. It is a much higher standard for Amy G. to prove that she is Nathan's natural
mother rather than a presumed mother. Compare, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610 (pro
viding that a parent-child relationship is established "[b]etween a child and the natural
mother ... by proof of her having given birth to the child"), with CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7611 (stating that a presumption of paternity is established by a man being married to
the natural mother or taking the child into his home and holding the child out as his
own).
264. N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
265. [d. at 360, 362.
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ing which presumption held greater weight.266 Similarly, Amy G.'s
claim is not that she is Nathan's biological mother. Rather, her
claim is that she has standing because she benefits from two pre
sumptions of maternity, and that the court should determine who
Nathan's legal mother is at trial.2 67 Since Amy G.'s claim is not
predicated on her being Nathan's biological mother, she should
have been treated like Paul in In re Jesusa V. and been granted
standing.
B.

Biology Should Not Trump in Determinations of Standing for
Parentage

This subpart details several reasons why a biological relation
ship with the child should not be the sole factor in determining
standing in a maternity action. Part III.B.l puts biology in proper
context as one of many factors that determines parentage. Part
III.B.2 analyzes why allowing a stepmother to have standing vio
lates neither policy nor logic because stepmothers are a class of pre
sumed parents who are accorded standing in parentage actions.
1.

Biology Is One of Many Factors that Determines
Parentage

The court should not have held that M.W.'s biological relation
ship with the child trumped all other considerations in determining
maternity. Biology should be only one of many factors that the
court considers in determining parentage. 268 The California Su
preme Court held that "biological paternity by a competing pre
sumed father does not necessarily defeat a nonbiological father's
presumption of paternity."269 Other cases have held that a person
with no biological parental relationship with the child can be a pre
sumed parent. 270 Therefore, since a biological relationship with the
266. /d. The husband claimed he benefited from the presumptions created by
being married to the mother at the time of the child's conception and taking the child
into his home. /d.
267. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 302-03. Amy G. should benefit from the pre
sumptions created by being married to Nathan's father at the time of Nathan's concep
tion and taking Nathan in and holding him out as her own. CAL. FAM. CODE § 761l.
268. The court weighed factors beyond "planting the biological seed" such as
looking at which person provided "stability, nurturance, family ties, [and] permanence"
in determining that a stepfather was the legal father. L.A. County Dep't of Children &
Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2004).
269. Id. at 12.
270. See, e.g., Alameda County Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas
H.), 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002) (holding that a father's admission that he was not the
biological father did not rebut his presumed parent status because to do so would
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child does not trump all other factors in all cases, biological mater
nity should not automatically defeat a nonbiological mother's pre
sumption of maternity.271
Furthermore, legislatures, in adopting the UPA, have striven to
include the greatest number of presumed fathers so that a child
would not be rendered parentless. 272 A biology-only approach to
standing would clearly frustrate this legislative intent. If biology
trumped all other presumptions, Jesusa, for example, would virtu
ally not have a father because Heriberto was incarcerated when
Jesusa's parentage was determined. 273 One can imagine that a situ
ation similar to Jesusa's may arise in which the biological mother is
incarcerated and the failure to grant a stepmother standing would
render the child, at least temporarily, motherless. Therefore, be
cause these cases show that men who are not biologically related to
the child can have standing, it is apparent that biology is not a con
clusive factor in making parentage determinations.
2.

Allowing a Stepmother to Have Standing in a Maternity
Action Does Not Violate "Policy and Logic"

As previously mentioned, many cases have declared that a par
ent-child relationship exists between the child and a person who has
no biological relationship to the child.274 There is no reason that
Amy G.'s situation should be treated any differently. However,
courts are still reluctant to declare maternity without a biological
relationship to the child. Professor Dalton noted, pre-Elisa B., that
a hierarchical system for categorizing non-biological parents has
developed. Non-married (usually lesbian) non-biological
render the child fatherless); Kern County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re
Salvador M.), 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing the trial court's deci
sion to deny presumed parent status to the half-sister of the child who took the child in
when the mother died and where the child's biological father was unknown, because the
half-sister held the child out as her own son and the child believed that he was her son);
L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (remanding an order that denied a child's petition for
a mother-child relationship where the child was taken in and cared for by a nonrelative
woman).
271. If biology were to automatically trump all other presumptions, it should be
the same presumption for fathers and mothers. Furthermore, if the principle was that
biology always trumps, each and every child should have a blood test at birth. Apple
ton, supra note 58, at 270.
272. See supra Part LA.
273. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 6-7.
274. See, e.g., In re Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705; In re Karen c., 124 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 677.
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mothers exist at the bottom of the hierarchy. . . . Married non
biological mothers exist in the middle of that hierarchy .... Mar
ried non-biological fathers exist at the top of that hierarchy. . ..
[T]he courts' assignment of parental status (and all of the rights
and responsibilities that adhere to that status) is based primarily
on an adult's position in this parenting hierarchy, a position that
is based on his/her sex and marital status. 275

After Elisa B. was decided, however, nonmarried, nonbiological
mothers have been afforded maternity rights in the context of
same-sex relationships.2 76 Therefore, it seems that married, nonbi
ological mothers have fallen to the bottom of this hierarchy. This
hierarchy was reinforced by Amy G., in which the court declined to
hold that Amy G. had standing. 277 The Amy G. court stated that
giving standing to Amy G. would have been antithetical to policy
and logic. 278 However, a finding of legal parentage in Amy G. and
G.G. would have been consistent with the marital presumption and
would have maintained the nuclear family-both favorable factors
in the parentage determination. 279 A decision to grant standing in a
maternity claim that is in line with policy and logic does not require
a biological relationship.280 Therefore, Amy G. should have been
granted standing.

c. Nathan Can Have Two Mothers Because Elisa B. Applies
The Amy G. court should have applied the principles of Elisa
B. 281 and held that Amy G. had standing because she could be N a
275. Dalton, supra note 56, at 311-12 (citation omitted).
276. See, e.g., Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 334 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (reversing the trial court's determination that a same-sex parent lacked standing
because under Elisa B., a "former lesbian partner may be able to establish parentage
under the Uniform Parentage Act as a presumed parent under a gender-neutral appli
cation of section 7611, subsection (d)" and remanding for a factual finding of whether
Charisma received the child into her home, held the child out as her own, actively par
ticipated in causing the child to be conceived, accepted the obligations of parenthood,
and whether there were any competing claims for status as the child's second parent).
277. Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review
denied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 2252 (2007).
278. Id. at 305.
279. See supra Part I.B.l & .2. "[I]t is actually the nuclear family model, and not
the biological parent-child relationships that theoretically support and define the stan
dard, to which courts are actually committed" instead of a biological presumption. Dal
ton, supra note 56, at 322.
280. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court of EI Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660, 666
(Cal. 2005).
281. Id. at 666-69.

2008]

SAY GOODBYE TO DONNA REED

811

than's mother. In Elisa B., the court held that a child can have two
female parents. 282 The principle was applied to the situation where
one mother had no biological relationship to the child, but had re
ceived the child into her home and held the child out as her own. 283
As a result of Elisa B., "[a] person's status as a presumed parent
may be established regardless of gender or biological connec
tion."284 Furthermore, "[a]fter Elisa B. it is much clearer that the
statutory presumption of parentage actually does apply equally re
gardless of biology, gender, sexual orientation, or marital status."285
Therefore, it should not matter that Amy G. is Nathan's stepmother
and not his stepfather. Under the reasoning of Elisa B., Amy G. is
a presumed parent because her gender is irrelevant to the presump
tions of parentage. 286
The court in Amy G. chose not to follow Elisa B. because in
Elisa B. the court's holding that Elisa was a presumed parent, and
ultimately a legal parent, was contingent on the statement that
there were "no competing claims to her being the children's second
parent."287 Since M.W. had a competing claim to Amy G.'s mater
nity, the court distinguished its decision from that in Elisa B.288
However, there are cases in which there have been competing
claims for paternity, and each of the presumed fathers was granted
standing and the court determined which one was the legal fa
ther. 289 Therefore, the application of Elisa B. should not be contin
gent upon whether there are competing claims because this creates
an inequitable result based on gender. If Amy G. had been a man
asserting paternity, she would have had standing despite competing
claims.290
282. /d. at 666.
283. [d. at 669; see Stone, supra note 68, at 531.
284. Wald, supra note 20, at 149.
285. [d.
286. See generally Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666 ("We perceive no reason why both
parents of a child cannot be women.").
287. Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting
Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670), review denied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal.
Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2252 (2007).
288. [d.
289. See L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re
Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). In
N.A.H. the court remanded the case for the trial court to weigh the competing claims of
paternity using the best interest of the child standard. [d.; see supra Part I.BA.
290. See generally Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666; In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2; N.A.H., 9
P.3d 354.
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The Marital Presumption Should Still Exist when the
Husband Is Biologically Related to the Child and the
Wife Is Asserting Maternity

The marital presumption or the presumption of legitimacy has
been a foundational principle for courts when determining parent
age. 291 This presumption should apply not only to husbands, but
also to wives. Part III.D.l discusses how the marital presumption is
ingrained in case law in a gender-biased way. Part III.D.2 argues
that the marital presumption should apply equally to women and
should not be rebutted when a wife admits that she has no biologi
cal relationship with the child.
1. The Historical Benefit of the Presumption of Marriage Is
Inequitably Linked to the Gender of the Spouse
The presumption of legitimacy "traditionally operates in a
gendered way."292 It "makes a married man the legal father of his
wife's biological children, but does not make a married woman the
legal mother of her husband's biological children."293 The pre
sumption of legitimacy for women has been hindered because legal
determinations of maternity are constantly linked to biology.294
This creates an inequitable result. Professor Frelich Appleton
noted that a husband may be presumed to be the father of his wife's
child because of the marital presumption, but a wife is not pre
sumed to be the mother of her husband's child. 295
If there is to be a presumption of legitimacy, it should extend
to both the wife and the husband. 296 The marital presumption pro
tects a child's welfare by promoting a two-parent structure and
291. See supra Part I.B.1.
292. Appleton, supra note 58, at 237; see Dalton, supra note 56, at 289.
293. Appleton, supra note 58, at 237; see also New, supra note 26, at 776 ("[T]he
legal definition of motherhood has historically been biological in nature. . .. Paternity
... has largely been socially defined ....").
294. Appleton, supra note 58, at 238.
295. /d. at 237; see Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 306-07 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (refusing to apply the marital presumption to a woman), review denied, No.
S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2252
(2007).
296. See Appleton, supra note 58, at 238. "When it comes to parentage, ... even
handed treatment of male and females eludes the courts because they 'remain incapable
of imagining a gender-free subject.'" Id. (quoting Dalton, supra note 56, at 266).
Moreover, Professor Appleton argued that the marital presumption should also apply
to same-sex couples because it supports child welfare and helps eliminate discrimina
tion based on sexual orientation. Id. at 230-31, 246.
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maintaining stability in a child's life. 297 Courts' differential treat
ment of parentage determinations based on gender is inequitable
because when women who are not biologically related to the child
seek legal maternity, "judges frequently respond by narrowly con
structing parenthood in ways that preserve traditional conceptions
of motherhood and family."298 Thus, when women want to estab
lish parentage based on the marital presumption, courts tend to shy
away. However, when men want to establish parentage based on
the marital presumption, they are granted standing merely because
of an unwarranted and inequitable adherence to traditional notions
of family and reproduction.2 99 Amy G. should not have been de
nied standing in the parentage action solely on the basis of gen
der-the marital presumption should apply to both the husband
and the wife.
2.

Because the Marital Presumption Is Not Rebutted by a
Husband Admitting He Is Not the Biological Father, It
Should Not Be Rebutted by a Wife Admitting She
Is Not the Biological Mother

Amy G.'s marital presumption should not be rebutted by her
admission that she is not the biological mother. In N.A.H., a step
father's claim to paternity was not rebutted 300 and his standing was
retained even after it was stipulated that he was not the child's bio
logical father. 30l With the exception of her gender, Amy G. is in
the same position as the husband in N.A.H. 302
297. See id. at 243-46; see also Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 913 (R.I.
1990) (holding that a trial judge in a divorce proceeding erred in allowing evidence that
disproved the husband's paternity because the "court's adherence to the statutory pre
sumption of paternity ... and [its] application of the equitable-estoppel doctrine lead to
the same point: the genetic blood test results offered into evidence were not relevant
because legal paternity had been established and biological paternity was not at issue."
(citing R.1. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-3(a)(3)(ii) (2003))); Zinsmeister, supra note 80, at 1006
07; supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the two-parent paradigm).
298. Dalton, supra note 56, at 293.
299. See generally L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C.
(In re Jesusa Y.), 85 P.3d 2, 7 (Cal. 2004); Appleton, supra note 58, at 238.
300. N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). The court ultimately did
not decide the issue of legal paternity, but remanded to determine the best interest of
the child. Id. at 366. However, in N.A.H., the parties agreed that genetic testing would
show the putative father to be the biological father within ninety-seven percent accu
racy. Id. at 358.
301. Id. at 358-59 (procedural posture); see also In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2.
302. Compare Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review
denied, No. S146841, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14215 (Cal. Nov. 29, 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 2252 (2007), with N.A.H., 9 P.3d 354.
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Section 106 of the UPA provides that sections of that Act gov
erning paternity apply equally to maternity actions. 303 The holding
in Amy G., that the marital presumption did not apply because of
her gender, was a drastic deviation from the court's prior gender
neutral application of the UPA.304 Along these lines, Professor Ap
pleton noted that "[ d]epartures from gender neutrality raise signifi
cant policy concerns that compel proceeding with caution. What
message does the law signal in treating female and male parents
differently?"30S As the husband in N.A.H. retained his standing in
his paternity action after admitting that he was not the biological
father, so too should Amy G. have retained her standing in her ma
ternity action. Notwithstanding her gender, she should benefit
from the marital presumption and her admission of the lack of a
biological relationship to the child should not rebut that
presumption.
E.

Courts Can Weigh Competing Presumptions for Maternity
Through a Gender-Neutral Reading of the Paternity Statutes

The court can weigh presumptions of maternity in the same
way that it weighs presumptions of paternity. In denying Amy G.
standing, the court stated that even if it found that Amy G. had
standing as a presumed mother, it could not weigh Amy G.'s and
M.W.'s claims because "[n]o mechanism exists in other provisions
of the UPA to resolve such a conflict."306 In effect, the court was
stating that because the drafters of the UPA did not include a mech
anism for weighing maternity claims, such a mechanism was not in
tended and the UPA should not be interpreted to include it. 307
However, this assertion is inconsistent with the way that courts
have previously interpreted the UPA.308
For example, in Johnson v. Calvert, the court decided that the
UPA governed surrogacy disputes and applied it to hold that a hus
303. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 106 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2008);
see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a) (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-122
(West 2005).
304. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal.
2005); L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.),
124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 106 (amended
2002), 9B U.L.A. 14.
305. Appleton, supra note 58, at 268.
306. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306.
307. [d.
308. See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779-80 (Cal. 1993) (applying
the UPA to situations that were not contemplated when the UPA was drafted).
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band and wife, whose genetic material was implanted into the ges
tational mother, were the legal parents of a child born to the
gestational mother. 309 The court eoted that the passage of the UPA
"clearly was not motivated by the need to resolve surrogacy dis
putes, which were virtually unknown in 1975."310 Accordingly, the
1975 version of the California's Act did not have an applicable pro
vision for weighing the claims of a gestational mother against those
of a genetic mother. 31l However, noting that the UPA "facially ap
plies to any parentage determination," the court applied it to the
surrogacy dispute. 312 Thus, the court in Johnson found the UPA
applicable to competing maternity claims, notwithstanding its lack
of an expressly provided mechanism because, "[n]ot uncommonly,
courts must construe statutes in factual settings not contemplated
by the enacting legislature."313
Johnson shows that courts should be flexible in applying the
UPA because advances in science and the evolving definition of
family frequently result in situations not considered by the drafters.
The court in Buzzanca v. Buzzanca stated that the reason that the
legislature and the courts have not made an explicit statement ap
plying paternity presumptions to maternity "is that the issue almost
never arises except for extraordinary cases involving artificial re
production."314 Buzzanca was decided in 1998.315 Since then, there
have been increasing scientific advances, and the definition of fam
ily has evolved. These changes have increasingly resulted in the
need to apply the UPA to unforeseen scenarios. As the court stated
in Buzzanca, even though cases involving maternity are not as com
mon as paternity actions, courts can still apply various provisions of
the UPA in the same manner that they apply to all parentage ac
tions. 316 Similarly, a court is not precluded from interpreting the
UPA in a gender-neutral fashion to weigh maternity claims. 317
Therefore, the court should have accorded Amy G. standing and
subsequently weighed her claim against M.W.'s claim.
309. Id. at 779, 782.
310. Id. at 779. The court was referring to California's version of the UPA, which
was introduced and enacted in 1975. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.; see also Milena D. O'Hara & Andrew W. Vorzimer, In re Marriage of
Buzzanca: Charting a New Destiny, 26 W. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 29 (1999).
314. Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
315. Id. at 280.
316. Id. at 289-290.
317. Id.; see lohnson, 851 P.2d at 779.
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CONCLUSION

The enactment and adoption of the UPA has been critical to
parentage determinations. However, the evolution of the definition
of family and scientific advances increasingly "make it difficult to
speak of an average American family";318 and make the Donna
Reed mold simply insufficient. Therefore, courts must interpret the
UPA to apply to situations that were unforeseen when the UPA was
drafted. There are a number of reasons why Amy G. should have
standing as an interested person in the maternity action through a
gender-neutral interpretation of the UPA. First, the presence of
competing claims to maternity is not dispositive because Nathan
can have more than two parents for the purposes of standing, and
the court must weigh the competing claims for a determination of
his two legal parents. 319 Second, it should not matter that Amy G.
was not biologically related to Nathan because biology does not
trump all in parentage determinations. 320 Third, Elisa B. applies
because standing in a maternity suit should not be contingent upon
the absence of competing claims to parentage, as this creates a dis
criminatory result based on gender. 321 Fourth, Amy G. should have
benefited from the marital presumption, which should not just be
afforded to the husband, but also to the wife. 322 Finally, the court
should have granted Amy G. standing and weighed her presump
tion against M.W.'s claim at trial because the UPA can be used to
resolve new issues not anticipated when the Act was drafted. 323
The court should have allowed Amy G. to have standing to assert
her claim so that other stepmothers, who have an established rela
tionship with their stepchildren, can raise a claim to maternity and
have standing to be heard. The time has come to say goodbye to
Donna Read and to embrace a gender-neutral reading of the stand
ing provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act.
Megan S. Calvo *

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.e.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.E.
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